The Evolution of Joint Operations

By Dr. Mel Deaile
Faculty Member, Military Studies Program at American Military University

Joint operations, like most things in life, constantly evolve in response to the internal and external environment.  Internally, the U.S. military has to respond to a post-war drawdown and increased pressure to find ways to become more efficient.  Externally, the Joint community has to respond to a growing dependence on networked operations and on that the enemy tends to operate like a network, having multiple nodes, little centralized control, and multiple lines of operation.  In the face of these challenges, how should Joint Operations evolve to meet the future operating environment?

The U.S. military has been doing joint operations even before General Grant and Admiral Porter synchronized their forces for the attack on Vicksburg during the Civil War. Despite advances in technology and doctrine, warfare remains a struggle between two independently willed forces, which means it is constantly changing. This is why Von Moltke suggested why no plan survives first contact with the enemy.[1]  The nature of joint operations will continue to be characterized by synchronization and  coordination of forces and effects in order to maximize the synergistic effect and respond to the changing nature of the environment. At the same time, the character of operations has certainly changed since the Civil War and has gone through the greatest transformation in recent decades.

The conduct of war in recent decades reflects contemporary policy, technology, and discourse. Initial computer systems were self-contained and a closed system.  The greater discourse of the day began to reflect this type of thinking. Hollywood gave us “War Games”, a fascinating look at what would happen if a closed system took over the nuclear functions of the United States defense. The idea of a closed system was something not only seen in technology and media; these ideas were seen in the planning and execution of war.

Warfare became modeled on the idea of the closed system, or in engineering terms, the negative feedback model. Negative feedback models are important because their main purpose is to eliminate error and increase predictability. Navigation systems on airplanes and guided missiles are built around this type of model where the system structure functions to remove error. Not only did weapon systems adopt negative feedback models, but so did warfare.  It was the Cold War and leaders wanted airmen, soldiers, and sailors that would act in a predicted manner. If told to ‘turn the key’ or ‘launch a nuclear weapon’, leaders wanted assurances their troops would perform the expected action. This type of thinking even found its way into the military’s approach to planning military operations.

Coming out of Vietnam, the military wanted to conduct operations in an organized, systematic manner where the outcome was clearly defined. The development of the military decision making process, the foundation for current military planning doctrine is a disciplined problem solving process with neatly defined inputs and outputs. The focus of the process was the destruction of the enemy’s centers of gravity and decisive points.

The problem with the negative feedback or closed system model is that it runs counter to the nature of warfare. As Clausewitz observed over 200 years ago, you cannot eliminate friction and fog. Today, information systems are not closed but linked.  Instead of a ‘closed world,’ we have a plugged in, networked world. The negative feedback model has given way to the positive feedback model.  In a positive feedback model, the error in the system can never be eliminated it must, however, be managed. A modern day example of open system in action is Global Warming; you can manage it but not eliminate it. Instead of simply finding and attacking centers of gravity and decisive points, modern approaches to warfare have taken a more holistic view and incorporated more open systems thinking into military planning. “Design,” the new term for this approach, emphasizes approaching a problem using soft systems theory, developing rich pictures to illustrate relationships, and even incorporating Geertzian thick description. It is a method that reflects not only an open systems approach to warfare, but recognition that current military operations are being conducted against networked entities.  Unlike closed systems, current warfare targets complex adaptive systems that have very little central organization. At the same time, the nature of the soldier on the battlefield is changing.

The Cold War model sought to produce predictable actions among the member of the armed forces. In an open system, the best a commander can try to do is ‘manage’ the errors introduced in the system. Clausewitz said the genius in commander was necessary to keep a balance between the irrationality of the people and the rationality of policy. Is the modern commander to be judged on his or her ability to maintain a balance between the virtual and real world? Every airmen and solider today is not only armed with weapon but a cell phone.  In a complex, chaotic system, even the smallest tremor can have tremendous reverberations in the system. The constant search for notoriety in the virtual world can run counter to the strategic objective in real world.  Joint Operations and Joint Commanders must emphasize how tremors in the Joint environment can have huge effects in the chaotic, complex operations area.

Joint Operations today need to emphasize a synthetic approach that captures the timeless aspects about the nature of warfare coupled with the evolving views on the conduct of war. In the last twenty years alone, we have moved from discourse and technology based on closed system towards an open networked architecture that recognizes one the truest aspects about the nature of war . . . very few things in war are predictable. The unpredictability in warfare stems from the fact that warfare has been, is, and will be in the future a clash of wills. Those who adapt to the fastest in warfare to the changing character of the battle of campaign will emerge victorious.

About the Author:
Dr. Mel Deaile is an associate professor in the Military Studies program.  He received a bachelor’s degree in astronautical engineering from the US Air Force Academy. He holds master’s degrees from Louisiana Tech University, the Army’s Command and General Staff College, and the Air Force’s School of Advanced Air and Space Studies.  In 2007, he graduated from UNC-Chapel Hill with a Ph.D. in American History. His dissertation focused on organizational culture in Strategic Air Command during the initial decades of the Cold War. Col Deaile is a veteran of Desert Storm, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, and Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and has flown combat missions in the B-52 and B-2 bombers.